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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WESLEY O.BAYLES, ; 
Petitioner/Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
LINDA CARYL BAYLES, ] 
Respondent/Appellee. ] 
) Appeals Case No. 200041133 
Second District Court No. 004702059 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of this case is vested with the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h), and pursuant to Rules 3(a) and 4(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue 1. Petitioner/Appellant has failed to marshall the evidence against the 
trial court's findings of fact. 
Issue 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to order 
specific performance. 
Issue 3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not allow Mr. 
1 
Bayles to deduct the same costs as if the properties had been sold to bona fide third party 
purchasers. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah App. 1995). 
In order to overturn the District Court's findings of fact, the appellant must "marshall the 
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial 
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' 
thus making them 'clearly erroneous'." Hagan v. Hagan. 810 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1991) 
(citations omitted). 
The District Court's legal conclusions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
Sigg v. Sigg. 905 P.2d 908, 912. "Trial courts may exercise broad discretion in adjusting 
the financial interests of parties to divorce and modification proceedings, so long as the 
decision is within the confines of legal precedence.... Where a trial court may exercise broad 
discretion, we presume the correctness of the court's decision absent 'manifest injustice or 
inequity that indicates a clear abuse of ...discretion'." Crockett v. Crockett. 836 P.2d 818, 
819 (Utah App. 1992), quoting Hansen v. Hansen. 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App. 1987). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(1) states: "When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obhgations, and 
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parties." Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(3) states: "The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations 
for debts as is reasonable and necessary.5' (Emphasis added.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal follows an evidentiary hearing held on November 10, 2004, before the 
Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District Court Judge, following an Order to Show Cause. The 
Petitioner/Appellant objects to the provisions of the Court's Order after Hearing concerning 
the amounts he was required to pay to the Respondent/Appellee to purchase her interest in 
two marital properties of the parties located in the State of California. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
L The parties were divorced following a trial on October 1-2,2002. Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and a Decree of Divorce, were entered on November 25,2002. 
(Record on Appeal, pages 148 et seq. and pages 167 et seq.) (See copies in the Addendum). 
2. The parties owned multiple parcels of property in Yuba County, California. 
The Court found in f 24 of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: "In light of the 
parties' past payment and debt history, the above-mentioned California properties should be 
sold as soon as possible." (Record on Appeal, page 153). 
3. The Court further found in % 15 of its Decree of Divorce: 
15. The petitioner is awarded a right of first refusal for the purchase of any 
and all of the California properties. Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer 
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to purchase a California property, the petitioner shall receive written notice of 
the acceptance of the offer and shall have thirty (30) days from the receipt of 
said notice to provide written notice of his election to purchase the property 
on the same terms as the bona fide offer. If petitioner exercises the right of 
first refusal, he shall pay the respondent the amount she would receive from 
the sale of that parcel, said payment to be made within 30 days of the time he 
exercises his right of first refusal. 
4. Two of the California properties are at issue in this appeal: 10695 
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California, which Petitioner/Appellant refers to as the 
"personal residence", and 10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California, which 
Petitioner/Appellant refers to as the "lake property". 
5. Mrs. Bayles, the Respondent/Appellee, listed all five properties for sale 
through a California realtor. She received an offer through the realtor for the purchase of the 
"personal residence". Mr. Bayles gave notice of his intention to exercise his right of first 
refusal to purchase this property, and tendered to Mrs. Bayles the sum of $39,286.74, 
together with a copy of a document entitled "Seller's Estimated Settlement Statement" dated 
5/30/03, listing the total sales price as $145,000.00, listing 10695 Forbestown Road as the 
sales property, and listing various expenses which he claimed as charges against the total 
sales price. (Record on Appeal page 283, included in Addendum). Mr. Bayles testified that 
he did not pay any real estate commissions, insurance, county transfer tax, escrow fees, 
FedEx or courier fees, hazard disclosure fees, termite or septic inspections, home warranty 
costs, and did not pay to have boundaries marked. He also did not pay all property taxes 
owed on the property at the time of sale. (Record on Appeal page 410, Transcript of 
November 10, 2004 hearing, page 127 line 20 through page 129, line 17; page 130 line 12 
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through page 131, line 6.) The trial court later found that Mr. Bayles did not actually incur 
all of these expenses, and found that his submission of that document to Mrs. Bayles was 
"tantamount to an affirmative representation that Petitioner had, in fact, incurred all those 
expenses in the amounts shown therein"(Order After Hearing f 5, Record on Appeal pages 
313-314). 
6. When Mrs. Bayles received the funds tendered by Mr. Bayles for the 
"personal residence", she responded in a letter indicating that she disputed his calculation 
of the amount she was owed for her interest in the "personal residence", and indicating her 
belief that Mr. Bayles had deducted expenses he had not incurred and that she was therefore 
owed more money. (Record on Appeal page 263, included in Addendum.) 
7. When Mr. Bayles purchased the "personal residence" from Mrs. Bayles, he 
did not pay ofif the existing financing to Mr. Helm, although Paragraph 17 of the Decree of 
Divorce provides that proceeds from the sale of any of the California properties should be 
applied to pay closing costs, real estate commissions and any existing mortgage obligations 
owing, including any tax or debt delinquencies. (Record on Appeal page 410, Transcript of 
November 10, 2004 hearing, page 124 line 5 through page 125 line 20.) 
8. Mr. Bayles acknowledged that there was a dispute about whether he had 
paid Mrs. Bayles her entire share for the purchase of the "personal residence" in a letter he 
wrote to her indicating his refusal to record the deed sent to him by Mrs. Bayles for that 
property. After delaying for some time, Mr. Bayles ultimately recorded the deed. (Record 
on Appeal page 410, Transcript of November 10,2004 hearing, page 126 line 5 through Page 
5 
127 line 4). 
9. Shortly after Mr. Bayles tendered funds to Mrs. Bayles for the "personal 
residence", he sent another check to Mrs. Bayles in the amount of $15,044.26 (Record on 
Appeal page 261) which he apparently intended as a downpayment for his purchase of the 
"lake property". Although he apparently based this on an offer for purchase received from 
a third party, Mrs. Bayles never accepted that third-party offer and therefore Mr. Bayles had 
no right of first refusal in the amount he proposed as the purchase price for the "lake 
property". (Decree of Divorce f 15, Record on Appeal page 170; Record on Appeal page 
410, Transcript of hearing November 10, 2004, page 109 line 14 through page 110 line 2). 
Mr. Bayles' testimony at the hearing of November 10, 2004 made clear that he was not 
making a separate offer to Mrs. Bayles, but was attempting to match an existing offer; in 
other words, he was attempting to exercise his right of first refusal. (Record on Appeal page 
410, Transcript of November 10, 2004, page 118, lines 6-20 and page 135, lines 2-4.) 
10. Mrs. Bayles responded to both payments with a letter dated June 30 
(Record on Appeal page 263, copy included in Addendum). In this letter she indicated her 
disagreement with the calculation of Mr. Bayles of the amount of her share for the "personal 
residence", and her refusal to sell him the "lake property5' at the price he set 
11. These issues ultimately came before Commissioner Dillon on an Order to 
Show Cause, and were certified for evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed the 
evidentiary hearing which was held on November 10, 2004. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Petitioner/Appellant has the burden to "marshall the evidence in support 
of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are 
so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,5 thus making them 
'clearly erroneous'." Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2D 478 (Utah App. 1991). He has failed to 
meet this burden, and thus the Court must assume that the findings of fact of the trial court 
are supported by the record. 
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it failed to order specific 
performance. There was no meeting of minds sufficient to create an enforceable contract on 
the terms claimed by Petitioner/Appellant as to either parcel of property. The parties 
disagreed about the gross sales price for the "lake property", and disagreed concerning the 
expenses which Mr. Bayles was entitled to charge to Mrs. Bayles for the "residence 
property." Without an enforceable contract, specific performance is inappropriate for either 
parcel of property. 
3. It was not an abuse of discretion when the trial court refused to permit Mr. 
Bayles to charge Mrs. Bayles for the same costs as if the properties had been sold to bona 
fide third party purchasers. The Court retains continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders for distribution of the property as is reasonable and necessary [Utah 
Code Ann. §30-3-5(3)]. This does not always constitute a modification of decree after a 
showing of change in circumstances, but also can include clarification, corrections, or 
adjustments necessary to carry out the intent of the court. Klein v. Klein. 544 P.2d 472 
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(Utah 1975). The trial court appropriately refused to give Mr. Bayles a windfall at the 
expense of Mrs. Bayles, refusing to allow him to charge her for expenses he did not incur. 
This order carried out the trial court's intention to equally divide between the parties the 
value of the marital properties. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER/APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO 
MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT. 
The Petitioner/Appellant fails to meet the standard of appellate review to overturn the 
trial court's decision. He has the burden to "marshall the evidence in support of the findings 
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence/ thus making them 'clearly 
erroneous'." Hagan v. Hagan. 810 P.2D 478 (Utah App. 1991). 
Mr. Bayles has not, in "comprehensive and fastidious order, [marshaled] every scrap 
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings [he] resists." 
Moon v. Moon. 973 P. 2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 1999) Instead of meeting his burden, Mr. 
Bayles simply states the facts as he wanted them to be. Some of his stated facts are contrary 
to his own testimony at the hearing on November 10, 2004. In cases such as this, the Court 
has stated that it will". . .[assume] that the record supports the findings of the trial court and 
[this Court] proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and 
the application of that law to the case." Shepherd v. Shepherd 876 P.2d 429,432 (Utah App. 
1994). Even if Mr. Bayles had met the first prong of marshalling the evidence, he has 
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failed to met the second prong, which calls for an analysis to expose any "fatal flaw in the 
evidence" sufficient to overturn the trial court's findings. Moon at 437. 
Since Mr. Bayles has not met his burden, this court should find the trial court's 
findings are supported by the record. 
EL THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT REFUSED TO ORDER SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 
A. Lake property (10691 Forbestown Road). The trial court below made 
a specific finding concerning the purchase by the Mr. Bayles of the "lake property" that 
"there was no meeting of minds sufficient to establish a contract for sale at a price of 
$72,000 between the parties". Mr. Bayles has not shown that this finding clearly erroneous; 
therefore, it must stand. With no "meeting of minds sufficient to establish a contract5', there 
can be no specific performance; there is no contract for the court to enforce with regard to 
the lake property. Further, the testimony of Mr. Bayles was not that he was making a 
separate, independent offer for purchase of the property from Mrs. Bayles; rather, he was 
merely attempting to exercise his right of first refusal. Because Mrs. Bayles had not 
accepted the third-party offer of $72,000 for the property, Mr. Bayles had no right of first 
refusal to purchase the property for $72,000. 
The case of Kier v. Condrack 478 P.2d 327, 25 Utah 2d 139 (Utah 1970) is 
distinguishable. In the Kier case, the sellers agreed to give buyers an option to purchase a 
specific parcel of property for the sum of $23,500 if the option was exercised by a specific 
date, leaving the payment terms open for negotiation. Both parties agreed to this option; 
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however, when the buyers gave notice of their intention to exercise the option, proposing 
to pay by assuming the balance owing on two mortgages and paying the difference in cash, 
the sellers simply refused to sell at the price previously agreed. The trial court in the Kier 
case believed that the sellers were not acting in good faith, and were making excuses because 
they had decided not to sell; therefore, specific performance was ordered, and this was 
upheld on appeal. However, in the case at hand, there was never an agreement between Mr. 
Bayles and Mrs. Bayles as to the purchase price for the "lake property". Mrs. Bayles was 
highly motivated to sell the property, but not for less than it was worth. Mr. Bayles could 
not exercise a right of first refusal to purchase for $72,000, as Mrs. Bayles had never 
accepted an offer in that amount; and she never gave Mr. Bayles any indication that she was 
willing to sell to him for that price. 
The case of R. J. Damn Construction Co. v. Child 247 P.2d 817 (Utah 1952) 
is closer to the situation at hand. Child submitted a bid to Daum in connection with Damn's 
bid as general contractor on a government construction job. In return, Daum sent a written 
contract to Child, which included terms with which Child did not agree and which had not 
been a part of Child's original bid. Child refused to enter into a contract, and refused to 
perform. In finding that there was no binding contract which could be enforced, the Court 
in that case stated:".. .there must be made manifest a definite intention to accept the offer and 
every part thereof and be presently bound thereby without material reservations or 
conditions." (247 P.2d 817, 819). The Court further went on to state at page 820: "An 
acceptance must be clear, positive, and unambiguous." That was not the case in Daum. and 
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it is not the case here. Mrs. Bayles made it very clear that she would not accept an offer of 
$72,000, and her position never changed. Without a definite intention by Mrs. Bayles to 
accept the offer made by Mr. Bayles, without reservations or conditions, there was no 
binding contract for the "lake property" for $72,000, and without a binding contract, there 
can be no specific performance. As stated in Pitcher v. Lauritzecu 423 P.2d 491, 18 Utah 2d 
368 (Utah 1967), at page 493, "Specific performance cannot be required unless all terms of 
the agreement are clear. The Court cannot compel the performance of a contract which the 
parties did not mutually agree upon." 
Mr. Bayles sent Mrs. Bayles the sum of $ 15,000.00 as a partial payment for 
his offer to purchase, with a promise to pay the balance within thirty (30) days. Mrs. Bayles 
responded that the offer was not acceptable, but she retained the funds as payment for funds 
already owed to her by Mr. Bayles. Mr. Bayles never tendered the balance of the purchase 
price under his offer, nor did he pay the funds into the court, place them in escrow, or make 
any effort to show that he stood ready, willing and able to complete the purchase on his 
proposed terms. Further, Mr. Bayles was given the benefit of the funds he paid to Mrs. 
Bayles which he claims she wrongly retained; $13,000.00 of those funds were applied by the 
Court to a prior judgment against him for unpaid alimony, and the balance was applied to 
offset the additional amount awarded to Mrs. Bayles for the "residence" property. Mrs. 
Bayles has not received a windfall from the funds sent to her by Mr. Bayles, and her 
retention of these funds while making it clear that she did not agree with the purchase price 
proposed by Mr. Bayles did not create a binding contract. 
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B. Residence property (10695 Forbestown Road). Mr. Bayles' attempt to 
create a contract subject to specific performance for the sale of this property consisted of his 
providing Mrs. Bayles with a "Seller's Estimated Settlement Statement" claiming that he had 
expenses of $66,426.52 (seepage 283 of the record on appeal), and tendering payment based 
on that document. At trial, Mr. Bayles testified that he had not, in fact, incurred all the 
expenses listed on the "Seller's Estimated Settlement Statement". The Court found 
specifically that supplying that document was "tantamount to an affirmative representation 
that Petitioner had, in fact, incurred all those expenses in the amounts shown therein" (f 5 of 
Order After Hearing, page 313 of the record on appeal). The Court further found that Mrs. 
Bayles was entitled to retain the funds tendered by Mr. Bayles, as she would be entitled 
receive at least that amount for her share of the residence property. 
Mrs. Bayles made it clear that while she agreed with the total sale price for this 
property of $145,000, she did not agree that Mr. Bayles was entitled to charge her for 
expenses he did not incur. This is also comparable to the situation in Daum. where a bid (the 
equivalent of Mrs. Bayles' agreement to sell for $145,000) did not create an enforceable 
contract when countered by a proposed contract with additional terms (Mr. Bayles' 
submission of the "Seller's Estimated Settlement Statement" with expenses he proposed 
charging to Mrs. Bayles). Without an enforceable contract for sale at $ 145,000 with all the 
expenses claimed by Mr. Bayles but not actually incurred, specific performance is not 
appropriate for the "personal residence" either. 
Further, it would not be equitable to allow Mr. Bayles to claim specific 
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performance of a "contract" which was based upon a "Seller's Estimated Settlement 
Statement" which represents that he had expenses of $66,426.52, when in fact he did not 
incur those expenses. A party to a contract should not be permitted, by a Court doing equity, 
to specifically enforce a contract based upon a misrepresentation. 
ffl. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
WHEN IT DID NOT ALLOW MR. BAYLES TO DEDUCT 
THE SAME COSTS AS IF THE PROPERTIES HAD BEEN SOLD 
TO BONA FIDE THIRD PARTY PURCHASERS. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that Mr. Bayles was not 
entitled to deduct the same costs as if the properties had been sold to bona fide third party 
purchasers. Stated another way, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused 
to permit Mr. Bayles to charge Mrs. Bayles for expenses which he did not actually incur. 
The Court retains continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for 
distribution of the property as is reasonable and necessary [Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(3)]. 
As was stated in Klein v. Klein. 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975), "...we see no reason why the 
court in its effort to do equity between these parties could not make whatever corrections or 
adjustments in the decree it deemed necessary to carry out that purpose." (544 P.2d 472, 
475.) The Klein case involved changes made by the trial court without an initial finding that 
there had been a change of circumstances. In the case ofLandv. Land 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 
1980), the parties were engaged in a dispute over the meaning of the term "equity" in their 
stipulated divorce. When the trial court attempted to define the term and how it would apply 
to the case, the Utah Supreme Court stated: "We deem it appropriate for the trial court to 
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have placed a common usage meaning upon the term and that is precisely what it did. By 
interpreting the term "equity" as it did, the court made an effort, not to supplant the original 
agreement, but simply to construe it in the manner as contemplated by the parties at the time 
it was drafted." (605 P.2d 1248, 1251). Certainly, if a trial court can interpret common 
usage terminology in a stipulation between parties, it has the authority in its discretion to 
interpret its own orders. 
This case is distinguishable from many others involving disputes over property 
distributions following a divorce, in that the majority of those cases involved stipulations of 
the parties which were approved by the Court and then embodied in a final Decree of 
Divorce. For example, in Williams v. Shearwood 688 P.2d 475, (Utah 1984), the trial court 
refused to modify a stipulated order granting an easement. Having first interpreted the 
language of the stipulation and order to grant an unconditional easement, and not an 
easement by necessity, (an interpretation not challenged by the Utah Supreme Court, and not 
considered a modification of the prior order), the trial court then found that the need for the 
easement still existed. That finding was affirmed on appeal. However, in this case there 
was no such stipulation, and the procedure for dividing the California property was 
established by the Court itself following trial. There is, therefore, no contract or agreement 
of the parties to be enforced, no "rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away" as in Lea 
v. Bowers 658 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah 1983) and the cases referenced therein. 
This case is closer to Hagan v. Hagan. 810 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1991), in 
which Mr. Hagan was given "fee title ownership" of the marital residence, and Mrs. Hagan 
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was given the right "to reside in said property for so long as she desires" in the original 
Decree of Divorce. In a subsequent trial, the trial court found that this right to reside in the 
marital home was a life estate for Mrs. Hagan, which included her right to rent out the 
marital residence and receive the rental proceeds without dividing them with Mr. Hagan. On 
appeal, these findings were upheld, and were not considered modifications of the original 
Decree but rather merely effects of the language of the original Decree of Divorce. 
Likewise, in Busch v. Busck 71 P.3d 177 (Ut. App. 2003), the trial court was 
ordered on remand to consider husband's motion to clarify an earlier divorce decree to 
determine whether the prior order to pay the parties' second mortgage was in the nature of 
alimony which could be terminated upon wife's remarriage. This was also not considered 
a modification proceeding, and the trial court clearly was given the discretion to consider 
making a clarification of the decree. 
It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court in this case to order that Mr. 
Bayles was not entitled to deduct any expenses of sale which he did not actually incur, when 
calculating the amount Mr. Bayles owed Mrs. Bayles for her share of the "residence 
property" (10695 Forbestown Road). It was within the court's discretion to do equity to 
avoid giving Mr. Bayles a windfall, by refusing to allow him to deduct as "expenses" 
amounts which he had not actually paid. It is worth noting that the trial court did not in fact 
"back out" all expenses which Mr. Bayles did not incur, but only the major expense of real 
estate commissions. The court has the discretion, and indeed the obligation, to do equity in 
allocating fairly (and in this case, attempting to allocate equally) the property of the parties 
15 
in a divorce proceeding; having done so, the ruling of the trial court should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Bayles has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion when it refiised to 
order specific performance concerning Mr. Bayles' purchase of the "residence property" and 
of the "lake property". In neither case was there an actual meeting of minds concerning all 
required terms of the transaction sufficient to create an enforceable contract. The trial court 
acted within its discretion in determining that Mrs. Bayles should only pay for expenses of 
sale which were actually incurred by Mr. Bayles, thereby avoiding a windfall to Mr. Bayles. 
This ruling was consistent with the intention of the trial court throughout this divorce 
proceeding that the parties would share equally in the proceeds of their assets. 
DATED thi^^day of /JJ/W^ - 2006' 
JUDYpAWN BARKING 
Attorney for the Respondent-Appellee 
Linoa Caryl Bayles 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Judy Dawn Barking, certify that on the ffirflay of May, 2006,1 served a 
copy of the attached Brief of the Respondent/Appellee upon Terry R. Spencer, the counsel 
for Petitioner/Appellant in this matter, by mailing to him by first class mail with sufficient 
postage prepaid to the following address: 
Terry R. Spencer 
Attorney at Law 
140 West 9000 South #9 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
JUDWAWM$A&$ING 




E. NORDELL WEEKS (3412) 
ERIC N. WEEKS (7340) 
WEEKS LAW FIRM 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
1050 Walker Terrace 
19 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 322-2800 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY O. BAYLES, 
I FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Petitioner CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
Civil No. 004702059 DA 
LINDA CARYL BAYLES, 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
Respondent | 
The above-entitled matter was heard before the Honorable 
Thomas L. Kay, Judge of the above-entitled court, pursuant to a 
trial on this matter held on October 1 through October 2, 2002. 
The Court, having reviewed the documents and pleadings on file 
herein, having heard testimony and reviewed documentation and 
being fully advised as to both the evidence and law pertaining 
thereto, hereby makes its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The petitioner is a resident of Davis County, State of 
Utah, and has been for at least three (3) months immediately prior 
to the filing of this action. 
INDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
FILED 
NOV 2 5 2002 
Uyton District Court 
2. The parties resided in the marital relationship in the 
State of Utah or the acts complained of by the petitioner were 
committed by the respondent in the State of Utah and therefore the 
above-captioned Court has jurisdiction over the respondent 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-27-24(6) (1953 as amended). 
3 . The petitioner and respondent were married in the City 
of Bountiful, State of Utah, on the 10th day of August, 1988, and 
separated on or about November 28, 2000. 
Grounds for Divorce 
4. During the course of this marriage, differences have 
arisen between the parties, which differences have now become 
irreconcilable, thereby making continuation of the marriage 
relationship impossible. 
5. The petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce 
from the respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences 
effective October 2, 2002. 
Children of the Parties 
6. No Children have been born as issue of this marriage 
and none are expected. 
7. The respondent currently has physical custody of two 
minor children, the petitioner's grand nephew Andrew Vincent 
Salazar and Andrew's sister BreAnna Rosa Flores Salazar, who are 
not the issue of this marriage. Custody is held pursuant to 
Salazar v. Salazat, case number 954904926 DA, filed in the Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
8. The Court finds that the issue of child support was 
not certified for trial and, even if it had been, there is no Utah 
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statute or case law that extends an obligation for petitioner to 
pay child support in this circumstance. 
Health Insurance 
9. Each party should maintain their own health, accident, 
hospitalization and dental insurance. The petitioner should 
provide any necessary cooperation in respondent's obtaining for 
her benefit continued health, accident, hospitalization and dental 
insurance coverage under the federal C.O.B.R.A. legislation, at 
the sole cost of the respondent. 
10. On February 14, 2002, the Commissioner ordered the 
petitioner to pay the respondent $1,100 per month commencing March 
1, 2002. The Commissioner allowed the petitioner to deduct from 
said payments the amount of $87.50 per month representing the 
respondent's share of monthly health insurance premiums paid by 
petitioner. He also ordered (in a separate paragraph) each party 
to be responsible for their own debts from the date of separation. 
11. On August 30, 2002, the Commissioner ruled that his 
Order was to be applied prospectively and not retroactively. He 
found the petitioner wrongfully withheld $1,312.50 representing 
one-half of the cost of health insurance premiums previously paid 
by petitioner for 15 months from the date of separation to the 
date of his Order (December 1, 2000, to February 14, 2002) and 
ordered the petitioner to reimburse the amount of $1,312.50 to the 
respondent. 
12. The petitioner has failed to reimburse to the 
respondent $1,312.50, representing petitioner's withholding of 1/2 
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of the cost of health insurance premiums paid from December 1, 
2000, through February 14, 2002 ($87.50 x 15 months = $1,312.50). 
Debts and Obligations 
13. The parties have incurred certain debts and 
obligations. The parties are unable to afford the lifestyle they 
have been maintaining and have incurred extensive credit card 
debt. 
14. The respondent should be required to pay and hold 
petitioner harmless on the debts owing on the Providian Card, the 
Citibank card, the Chase/Walmart Card, and the MBNA card. 
15. The petitioner should be required to pay and hold 
the respondent harmless on the debts owing on the America First 
Credit Union Visa card, the line of credit at America First Credit 
Union, and the Firestone account. 
16. Since the separation of the parties, the petitioner 
has paid approximately $61,000 toward the marital debt obligations 
that existed at the time of separation. The petitioner shall not 
receive any credit or offset in the marital settlement for such 
payments. This Court finds that the majority of the debt was 
incurred by the petitioner and that petitioner had the financial 
ability to pay the debt and the respondent did not. 
Real Property 
17. The petitioner and the respondent have acquired a 
residence located at 1422 Vineyard Drive, Bountiful, Utah (the 
"Bountiful Residence"). The Bountiful Residence should be awarded 
to the petitioner subject to the debt thereon. The respondent 
should cooperate in executing a quitclaim deed in favor of the 
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petitioner or other documents necessary to relinquish her interest 
in the Bountiful Residence. 
18. The petitioner should be permitted to sell the 
Bountiful Residence, with the respondent having no further claim 
or interest therein. The petitioner should be permitted to retain 
any profit or be responsible for any loss associated with any sale 
thereof. Respondent shall cooperate in executing any documents 
and taking any steps necessary to allow the petitioner to proceed 
with the sale and transfer of the Residence. 
19. The respondent should not be responsible for 
payment of the first and second mortgage on the Bountiful 
Residence for the period she resided in the Residence from the 
date of separation through the time she moved to Oklahoma in 
August 2001. 
20. The parties have acquired additional interests in 
certain other real property, including but not limited to 
(a) Parcel 1 of land and associated improvements located at 10692 
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (b) Parcel 13 of land 
and associated improvements located at 10747 Forbestown Road, Yuba 
County, California; (c) Parcel 15 of land and associated 
improvements located at 10695 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, 
California; (d) Parcel 16 of land and associated improvements 
located at 10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; and 
(e) Parcels 8 and 10 of land located in Yuba County, California, 
also known as the Beehive Mine. 
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21. Parcels 1, 13, 15, 'and 16 are found to be jointly 
held by the parties and should be considered joint marital 
property. 
22. The Court finds that there is not clear and 
convincing evidence of duress associated with plaintiff's transfer 
of parcels 8 and 10 to the respondent as a joint tenant. Parcels 
8 and 10 should be considered joint marital property. 
23. The real property and improvements known as Parcel 
2 (also known as parcels 22 and 23) located at approximately 10681 
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California shall be considered joint 
marital property. There is not sufficient evidence to 
conclusively track the funds used to purchase the property and to 
establish the lack of commingling that would be required to 
establish Parcel 2 (also referred to as Parcels 22 and 23) as the 
separate property of the petitioner. 
24. In light of the parties' past payment and debt 
history, the above-mentioned California properties should be sold 
as soon as possible. 
25. The petitioner shall hereinafter be entitled to 
retain the rental income from Parcels 1 and 15 and shall be 
obligated to maintain the monthly payments on the mortgages for 
said parcels through the date of sale of said properties. 
26. The petitioner should be awarded a right of first 
refusal for the purchase of any and all of the California 
properties. Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer to purchase a 
California property, the petitioner shall receive written notice 
of the acceptance of the offer and shall have thirty (3 0) days 
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from the receipt of said notice to provide written notice of his 
election to purchase the property on the same terms as the bona 
fide offer. If petitioner exercises the right of first refusal, 
he shall pay the respondent the amount she would receive from the 
sale of that parcel, said payment to be made within 3 0 days of the 
time he exercises his right of first refusal. 
27. The respondent is awarded a secondary right of 
first refusal. In the event that the petitioner fails to exercise 
his right of first refusal within thirty (30) days following his 
receipt of notice of acceptance of a bona fide offer, the 
respondent shall thereafter have thirty (3 0) days to provide 
written notice of her election to purchase the property on the 
same terms as the bona fide offer. If respondent exercises her 
right of first refusal, she shall pay the petitioner the amount he 
would receive from the sale of that parcel, said payment to be 
made within 30 days of the time she exercises her right of first 
refusal. 
28. At the time of closing on the sale of each 
California property, proceeds from the sale shall first be applied 
to pay any and all closing costs, real estate commissions or fees, 
and any existing mortgage obligations owing, including any tax 
and/or debt delinquencies owed in relation to the property. After 
such costs have been paid, the petitioner shall be entitled to 
receive one-half 6f the total amount of payments he has made 
toward delinquent and current taxes on the property and, as 
applicable, one-half of the total amount he has paid toward the 
mortgage obligations in the property commencing with the month of 
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October 2002 through the date of sale. Any and all remaining 
proceeds from the sale of the property shall be split equally 
between the parties. 
29. The Court finds that the real property and 
improvements located at (a) 1441 Michigan Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and (b) Blanding, Utah, are the separate, inherited propert 
of the petitioner. 
30. The petitioner has made no claim in these 
proceedings as to any ownership interest in the home in which 
respondent is residing in the State of Oklahoma nor to the 
respondent's mother's home in Oklahoma. 
Personal Property 
31. The parties have acquired certain joint marital 
personal property, including household furniture, motor vehicles, 
and certain personal property and possessions. 
32. The respondent should be awarded those personal 
heirlooms located at the California properties, namely plates, 
platters, clocks, and lamps. The court finds that the ski pole i 
the possession of the petitioner is a family heirloom of the 
respondent and respondent shall be awarded the ski pole. 
Petitioner shall be permitted to make a model of the ski pole and 
shall deliver possession of the ski pole to the respondent within 
90 days of entry of this Order at her place of residence and at 
the expense of th6 petitioner. 
33. The remainder of the personal property should be 
awarded to the parties as currently divided. 
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34. The petitioner has received approximately $15,000 
more in value of personal property than has the respondent. 
35. The Court finds that the petitioner has paid 
$15,000 to the respondent, which shall be considered an offset for 
the additional value of personal property received by the 
petitioner. 
Alimony 
36. The petitioner has made monthly payments to the 
respondent from the date of separation, including the total amount 
of $8,337 in monthly payments during the period from February 14, 
2002, through the month of October 2002. These payments shall be 
considered temporary alimony. 
37. The respondent has the ability to earn $8 per hour 
and to work 40 hours per week. The petitioner is not working like 
he used to work, but historically has had a greater ability to pay 
expenses than the respondent has ability to earn money. 
38. Commencing with the month of November 2002, the 
petitioner should hereinafter be obligated to pay alimony to the 
respondent in the monthly amount of $1,000, payable one-half on 
the 5th of the month and one-half on the 20th of each month, to 
continue until alimony is reviewed at the time of petitioner's 
retirement. Alimony shall terminate as determined by the Court or 
upon the marriage or cohabitation of the respondent, the death of 
either party, or ipon the occurrence of any event, which, under 
Utah law, shall cause alimony to cease. 
39. The alimony award shall be reviewed at the time of 
petitioner's retirement. Based upon the current circumstances of 
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the parties, petitioner's retirement shall be considered to be a 
sufficient basis to perfnit a review of alimony. At the time of 
review, the Court shall make determinations as to whether the 
monthly alimony payments will be modified or discontinued. Such 
review shall be made in conjunction with review of the issues 
related to payment of retirement and survivor benefits set forth 
in the following section. 
Pensions and Retirement Benefits 
40. The petitioner has acquired pension and retirement 
funds prior to and during the term of the marriage of the parties. 
The respondent should be entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of the 
petitioner's pension and retirement funds which were accrued 
during the term of the marriage pursuant to the Woodward formula 
and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue in 
association therewith. 
41. The petitioner's retirement plan includes an option 
to elect either full or partial survivor benefits. The Court 
finds that election of a survivor benefit will decrease the total 
monthly benefit payment under petitioner's pension and retirement 
plan in an amount that cannot be calculated to an exact amount at 
this time. The Court reserves for future determination the issue 
of the amount of survivor benefits to be awarded to the respondent 
and the issue of which party shall pay the monthly cost. Such 
determination shall be made at the time of petitioner's 
retirement, subject to the provision of the following paragraph. 
42. In order to avoid forfeiture of the ability to 
elect a full survivor benefit, the petitioner shall not elect a 
10 
reduced survivor benefit prior to the Court's determination 
pursuant to the provision in paragraph 41 above. 
Life Insurance 
43. The respondent should be listed as a one-half-
interest beneficiary on the currently existing life insurance 
policy on petitioner's life. The court finds that such 
designation is equitable considering the length of the marriage of 
the parties. 
Attorney's Fees 
44. The Court finds three reasons for awarding attorney 
fees in this case. First, the respondent did not ask for the 
divorce and did not want the divorce so she had to hire an 
attorney. Secondly, the Court finds the respondent does not have 
the ability to pay. Thirdly, in light of the rulings previously, 
the respondent prevailed in more issues than the petitioner. 
45. The petitioner shall pay $1,500 toward respondent's 
attorney's fees by December 2, 2002, based upon petitioner's 
ability to pay a portion of the fees. The respondent should be 
ordered to assume and pay the remainder of her own costs and 
attorney's fees incurred herein. The petitioner should be ordered 
to assume and pay his own costs and attorney's fees incurred 
herein. 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
46. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver 
to the other party any documents required to implement or support 
the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The parties are subject to the jurisdiction of this 
Court as set forth above in the Court's Findings of Fact. 
2. The petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce 
from the respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences 
effective October 2, 2002. 
Children of the Parties 
3 . The petitioner shall not be obligated to pay child 
support to the respondent in regards to Andrew and BreAnna. 
Health Insurance 
4. Each party should maintain their own health, accident, 
hospitalization and dental insurance. The petitioner should 
provide any necessary cooperation in respondent's obtaining for 
her benefit continued health, accident, hospitalization and dental 
insurance coverage under the federal C.O.B.R.A. legislation, at 
the sole cost of the respondent. 
5. On February 14, 2002, the Commissioner ordered the 
petitioner to pay the respondent $1,100 per month commencing March 
1, 2002. The Commissioner allowed the petitioner to deduct from 
said payments the amount of $87.50 per month representing the 
respondent's share of monthly health insurance premiums paid by 
petitioner. He also ordered (in a separate paragraph) each party 
to be responsible for their own debts from the date of separation. 
6. The respondent shall be entitled to receive the 
insurance check in the amount of $1,636.03 in satisfaction of the 
$1,312.50 owing pursuant to paragraph 6 above. The Court finds 
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that the check has already been delivered to the respondent as 
satisfaction of said obligation. 
Debts and Obligations 
7. The respondent should be required to pay and hold 
petitioner harmless on the debts owing on the Providian Card, the 
Citibank card, the Chase/Walmart Card, and the MBNA card. 
8. The petitioner should be required to pay and hold the 
respondent harmless on the debts owing on the America First Credit 
Union Visa card, the line of credit at America First Credit Union, 
and the Firestone account. 
9. Since the separation of the parties, the petitioner 
has paid approximately $61,000 toward the marital debt obligations 
that existed at the time of separation. The petitioner shall not 
receive any credit or offset in the marital settlement for such 
payments. 
Real Property 
10. The Bountiful Residence should be awarded to the 
petitioner subject to the debt thereon. The respondent should 
cooperate in executing a quitclaim deed in favor of the petitioner 
or other documents necessary to relinquish her interest in the 
Bountiful Residence. 
11. The petitioner should be permitted to sell the 
Bountiful Residence, with the respondent having no further claim 
or interest therein. The petitioner should be permitted to retain 
any profit or be responsible for any loss associated with any sale 
thereof. Respondent shall cooperate in executing any documents 
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and taking any steps necessary to allow the petitioner to proceed 
with the sale and transfer of the Residence. 
12. The respondent should not be responsible for 
payment of the first and second mortgage on the Bountiful 
Residence for the period she resided in the Residence from the 
date of separation through the time she moved to Oklahoma in 
August 2001. 
13. The parties have acquired additional interests in 
certain other real property, including but not limited to 
(a) Parcel 1 of land and associated improvements located at 10692 
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (b) Parcel 13 of land 
and associated improvements located at 10747 Forbestown Road, Yuba 
County, California; (c) Parcel 15 of land and associated 
improvements located at 10695 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, 
California; (d) Parcel 16 of land and associated improvements 
located at 10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; 
(e) Parcels 8 and 10 of land located in Yuba County, California, 
also known as the Beehive Mine; and (f) Parcel 2 of land located 
in Yuba County, California, also known as Parcels 22 & 23. 
14. The above-mentioned California properties should be 
sold as soon as possible. 
15. The petitioner shall hereinafter be entitled to 
retain the rental income from Parcels 1 and 15 and shall be 
obligated to maintain the monthly payments on the mortgages for 
said parcels through the date of sale of said properties. 
16. The petitioner is awarded a right of first refusal 
for the purchase of any and all of the California properties. 
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Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer to purchase a California 
property, the petitioner shall receive written notice of the 
acceptance of the offer and shall have thirty (3 0) days from the 
receipt of said notice to provide written notice of his election 
to purchase the property on the same terms as the bona fide offer. 
If petitioner exercises the right of first refusal, he shall pay 
the respondent the amount she would receive from the sale of that 
parcel, said payment to be made within 3 0 days of the time he 
exercises his right of first refusal. 
17. The respondent is awarded a secondary right of 
first refusal. In the event that the petitioner fails to exercise 
his right of first refusal within thirty (30) days following his 
receipt of notice of acceptance of a bona fide offer, the 
respondent shall thereafter have thirty (30) days to provide 
written notice of her election to purchase the property on the 
same terms as the bona fide offer. If respondent exercises her 
right of first refusal, she shall pay the petitioner the amount he 
would receive from the sale of that parcel, said payment to be 
made within 30 days of the time she exercises her right of first 
refusal. 
18. At the time of closing on the sale of each 
California property, proceeds from the sale shall first be applied 
to pay any and all closing costs, real estate commissions or fees, 
and any existing mortgage obligations owing, including any tax 
and/or debt delinquencies owed in relation to the property. After 
such costs have been paid, the petitioner shall be entitled to 
receive one-half of the total amount of payments he has made 
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toward delinquent and current taxes on the property and, as 
applicable, one-half of the total amount he has paid toward the 
mortgage obligations in the property commencing with the month of 
October 2002 through the date of sale. Any and all remaining 
proceeds from the sale of the property shall be split equally 
between the parties. 
19. The real property and improvements located at 
(a) 1441 Michigan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, and (b) Blanding, 
Utah, are the separate, inherited property of the petitioner. 
Personal Property 
20. The respondent should be awarded those personal 
heirlooms located at the California properties, namely plates, 
platters, clocks, and lamps. The court finds that the ski pole in 
the possession of the petitioner is a family heirloom of the 
respondent and respondent shall be awarded the ski pole. 
Petitioner shall be permitted to make a model of the ski pole and 
shall deliver possession of the ski pole to the respondent within 
90 days of entry of this Order at her place of residence and at 
the expense of the petitioner. 
21. The remainder of the personal property should be 
awarded to the parties as currently divided. 
22. The $15,000 previously paid to the respondent shall 
be considered an offset for the additional value of personal 
property received by the petitioner. 
Alimony 
23. The petitioner has made monthly payments to the 
respondent from the date of separation, including the total amount 
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of $8,337 in monthly payments during the period from February 14, 
2002 through the month of October 2002. These payments shall be 
considered temporary alimony, 
24. Commencing with the month of November 2002, the 
petitioner should hereinafter be obligated to pay alimony to the 
respondent in the monthly amount of $1,000, payable one-half on 
the 5th of the month and one-half on the 20th of each month, to 
continue until alimony is reviewed at the time of petitioner's 
retirement. Alimony shall terminate as determined by the Court or 
upon the marriage or cohabitation of the respondent, the death of 
either party, or upon the occurrence of any event, which, under 
Utah law, shall cause alimony to cease. 
25. The alimony award shall be reviewed at the time of 
petitioner's retirement. Based upon the current circumstances of 
the parties, petitioner's retirement shall be considered to be a 
sufficient basis to permit a review of alimony. At the time of 
review, the Court shall make determinations as to whether the 
monthly alimony payments will be modified or discontinued. Such 
review shall be made in conjunction with review of the issues 
related to payment of the retirement and survivor benefits set 
forth in the following section. 
Pensions and Retirement Benefits 
26. The petitioner has acquired pension and retirement 
i 
funds prior to and during the term of the marriage of the parties. 
The respondent should be entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of the 
petitioner's pension and retirement funds which were accrued 
during the term of the marriage pursuant to the Woodward formula 
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and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue in 
association therewith. 
27. The petitioner's retirement plan includes an option 
to elect either full or partial survivor benefits. The Court 
finds that election of a survivor benefit will decrease the total 
monthly benefit payment under petitioner's pension and retirement 
plan in an amount that cannot be calculated to an exact amount at 
this time. The Court reserves for future determination the issue 
of the amount of survivor benefits to be awarded to the respondent 
and the issue of which party shall pay the monthly cost. Such 
determination shall be made at the time of petitioner's 
retirement, subject to the provision of the following paragraph. 
28. In order to avoid forfeiture of the ability to 
elect a full survivor benefit, the petitioner shall not elect a 
reduced survivor benefit prior to the Court's determination 
pursuant to the provision in paragraph 27, above. 
Life Insurance 
29. The respondent should be listed as a one-half-
interest beneficiary on the currently existing life insurance 
policy on petitioner's life. The court finds that such 
designation is equitable considering the length of the marriage of 
the parties. 
Attorney's Fees 
30. The petitioner shall pay $1,500 toward respondent's 
attorney's fees by December 2, 2002. The respondent should be 
ordered to assume and pay the remainder of her own costs and 
attorney's fees incurred herein. The petitioner should be ordered 
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to assume and pay his own costs and attorney's fees incurred 
herein. 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
31. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver 
to the other party any documents required to implement or support 
the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
1MADE AND ENTERED this c\i^day of November, 2002. 
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tayton District Court 
VC10820269 
BAYLES, LINDA CAF cD 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WESLEY O. BAYLES, 
Petitioner, 
vs 
LINDA CARYL BAYLES, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 004702059 DA 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
The above-entitled matter was heard before the Honorable 
Thomas L. Kay, Judge of the above-entitled court, pursuant to a 
trial held on October 1 and October 2, 2002. The Court, having 
reviewed the documents and pleadings on file herein, having heard 
argument and testimony, and being fully advised as to both the 
evidence and law pertaining thereto, and having previously entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows: 
1. The parties are subject to the jurisdiction of this 
Court as set forth above in the Court's Findings of Fact. 
2 . The petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce 
from the respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences 
effective October 2, 2002. 
fVLUlUitoo 
Children of the Parties 
3 . The petitioner is not obligated to pay child support 
to the respondent in regards to Andrew Vincent Salazar and BreAnna 
Rosa Flores Salazar. 
Health Insurance 
4. Each party shall maintain their own health, accident, 
hospitalization and dental insurance. The petitioner shall 
provide any necessary cooperation in respondent's obtaining for 
her benefit continued health, accident, hospitalization and dental 
insurance coverage under the federal C.O.B.R.A. legislation, at 
the sole cost of the respondent. 
5. The respondent shall be entitled to receive the 
insurance check in the amount of $1,636.03 in satisfaction of the 
$1,312.50 owing pursuant to the Commissioner's earlier 
recommendation. The check has already been delivered to the 
respondent as satisfaction of said obligation. 
Debts and Obligations 
6. The respondent is required to pay and hold petitioner 
harmless on the debts owing on the Providian Card, the Citibank 
card, the Chase/Walmart Card, and the MBNA card. 
7. The petitioner is required to pay and hold the 
respondent harmless on the debts owing on the America First Credit 
Union Visa card, the line of credit at America First Credit Union, 
and the Firestone account. 
8. Since the separation of the parties, the petitioner 
has paid approximately $61,000 toward the marital debt obligations 
that existed at the time of separation. The petitioner shall not 
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receive any credit or offset in the marital settlement for such 
payments. 
Real Property 
9. The Bountiful Residence is awarded to the petitioner 
subject to the debt thereon. The respondent shall execute a 
quitclaim deed in favor of the petitioner or other documents 
necessary to relinquish her interest in the Bountiful Residence. 
10. The petitioner is permitted to sell the Bountiful 
Residence, with the respondent having no further claim or interest 
therein. The petitioner shall be permitted to retain any profit 
or be responsible for any loss associated with any sale thereof. 
Respondent shall cooperate in executing any documents and taking 
any steps necessary to allow the petitioner to proceed with the 
sale and transfer of the Residence. 
11. The respondent is not responsible for payment of 
the first and second mortgage on the Bountiful Residence for the 
period she resided in the Residence from the date of separation 
through the time she moved to Oklahoma in August 2001. 
12. The parties jointly hold certain other real 
property, namely (a) Parcel 1 of land and associated improvements 
located at 10692 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (b) 
Parcel 13 of land and associated improvements located at 10747 
Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California; (c) Parcel 15 of land 
and associated improvements located at 10695 Forbestown Road, Yuba 
County, California; (d) Parcel 16 of land and associated 
improvements located at 10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, 
California; (e) Parcels 8 and 10 of land located in Yuba County, 
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California, also known as the Beehive Mine; and (f) Parcel 2 of 
land located in Yuba County, California, also known as Parcels 22 
& 23. 
13. The above-mentioned California properties shall be 
sold as soon as possible. 
14. The petitioner is hereinafter entitled to retain 
the rental income from Parcels 1 and 15 and is obligated to 
maintain the monthly payments on the mortgages for said parcels 
through the date of sale of said properties. 
15. The petitioner is awarded a right of first refusal 
for the purchase of any and all of the California properties. 
Upon acceptance of any bona fide offer to purchase a California 
property, the petitioner shall receive written notice of the 
acceptance of the offer and shall have thirty (3 0) days from the 
receipt of said notice to provide written notice of his election 
to purchase the property on the same terms as the bona fide offer. 
If petitioner exercises the right of first refusal, he shall pay 
the respondent the amount she would receive from the sale of that 
parcel, said payment to be made within 3 0 days of the time he 
exercises his right of first refusal. 
16. The respondent is awarded a secondary right of 
first refusal. In the event that the petitioner fails to exercise 
his right of first refusal within thirty (30) days following his 
receipt of notice of acceptance of a bona fide offer, the 
respondent shall thereafter have thirty (30) days to provide 
written notice of her election to purchase the property on the 
same terms as the bona fide offer. If respondent exercises her 
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right of first refusal, she shall pay the petitioner the amount he 
would receive from the sale of that parcel, said payment to be 
made within 30 days of the time she exercises her/ right of first 
refusal. 
17. At the time of closing on the sale of each 
California property, proceeds from the sale shall first be applied 
to pay any and all closing costs, real estate commissions or fees, 
and any existing mortgage obligations owing, including any tax 
and/or debt delinquencies owed in relation to the property. After 
such costs have been paid, the petitioner shall be entitled to 
receive one-half of the total amount of payments he has made 
toward delinquent and current taxes on the property and, as 
applicable, one-half of the total amount he has paid toward the 
mortgage obligations in the property commencing with the month of 
October 2002 through the date of sale. Any and all remaining 
proceeds from the sale of the property shall be split equally 
between the parties. 
18. The real property and improvements located at 
(a) 1441 Michigan Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, and (b) Blanding, 
Utah, are the separate, inherited property of the petitioner. 
Personal Property 
19. The respondent is awarded those personal heirlooms 
located at the California properties, namely plates, platters, 
clocks, and lamps. The ski pole in the possession of the 
petitioner is a family heirloom of the respondent and respondent 
is awarded the ski pole. Petitioner is permitted to make a model 
of the ski pole and shall deliver possession of the ski pole to 
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the respondent within 90 days of entry of this Decree at her place 
of residence and at the expense of the petitioner. 
20. The remainder of the personal property is awarded 
to the parties as currently divided. 
21. The $15,000 previously paid to the respondent shall 
be considered an offset for the additional value of personal 
property received by the petitioner. 
Alimony 
22 . The petitioner has made monthly payments to the 
respondent from the date of separation, including the total amount 
of $8,337 in monthly payments during the period from February 14, 
2002 through the month of October 2002. These payments shall be 
considered temporary alimony. 
23. Commencing with the month of November 2002, the 
petitioner is hereinafter obligated to pay alimony to the 
respondent in the monthly amount of $1,000, payable one-half on 
the 5th of the month and one-half on the 20th of each month, to 
continue until alimony is reviewed at the time of petitioner's 
retirement. Alimony shall terminate as determined by the Court or 
upon the marriage or cohabitation of the respondent, the death of 
either party, or upon the occurrence of any event, which, under 
Utah law, shall cause alimony to cease. 
24. The alimony award shall be reviewed at the time of 
petitioner's retirement. Based upon the current circumstances of 
the parties, petitioner's retirement shall be considered to be a 
sufficient basis to permit a review of alimony. At the time of 
review, the Court shall make determinations as to whether the 
6 
monthly alimony payments will be modified or discontinued. Such 
review shall be made in conjunction with review of the issues 
related to payment of the retirement and survivor' benefits set 
forth in the following section. 
Pensions and Retirement Benefits 
25. The petitioner has acquired pension and retirement 
funds prior to and during the term of the marriage of the parties. 
The respondent is entitled to receive one-half (1/2) of the 
petitioner's pension and retirement funds which were accrued 
during the term of the marriage pursuant to the Woodward formula 
and a Qualified Domestic Relations Order shall issue in 
association therewith. 
26. The petitioner's retirement plan includes an option 
to elect either full or partial survivor benefits. The Court 
finds that election of a survivor benefit will decrease the total 
monthly benefit payment under petitioner's pension and retirement 
plan in an amount that cannot be calculated to an exact amount at 
this time. The Court reserves for future determination the issue 
of the amount of survivor benefits to be awarded to the respondent 
and the issue of which party shall pay the monthly cost. Such 
determination shall be made at the time of petitioner's 
retirement, subject to the provision of the following paragraph. 
27. In order to avoid forfeiture of the ability to 
elect a full survivor benefit, the petitioner shall not elect a 
reduced survivor benefit prior to the Court's determination 




28. The respondent shall be listed as a one-half-
interest beneficiary on the currently existing life insurance 
policy on petitioner's life. 
Attorney's Fees 
29. The petitioner shall pay $1,500 toward respondent's 
attorney's fees by December 2, 2002. The respondent is ordered to 
assume and pay the remainder of her own costs and attorney's fees 
incurred herein. The petitioner is ordered to assume and pay his 
own costs and attorney's fees incurred herein. 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
30. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the 
other party any documents required to implement or support the 
provisions of this Decree. 
MADE AND ENTERED this ^M^day of November, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
T?fy ^ ^yj ,~-
HONORABLE ^5MAS L. J«^i tSp^ ^ 
District Court JudgeY^\V*^>.«uv 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
iAWN^BARKING 
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JUDY DAWN BARKING, #0211 of 
PATTERSON, BARKING & LARKIN 
Attorney for Respondent 
427 27th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-7704 
FILED 
Dayton District Court 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 
WESLEY O. BAYLES, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
LINDA CARYL BAYLES, 
Respondent, 
ORDER AFTER HEARING 
Civil No. 004702059DA 
Judge: Thomas L. Kay 
Commissioner: David L. Dillon 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on November 
10, 2004, before the Honorable Thomas L. Kay, District Court Judge, 
presiding, for evidentiary and objection hearing from Orders to 
Show Cause filed by both parties. Petitioner was present, and was 
represented by his counsel, Michael D. Murphy; Respondent was 
present, and was represented by her counsel, Judy Dawn Barking. 
The Court having heard the evidence of the parties, and being fully 
advised in the premises, hereby enters the following: 
ORDER 
1. Beehive Mine property (APN 8, 10, Yuba County, 
California). Petitioner has indicated his intention to exercise 
his right of first refusal for this property. Therefore, he shall 
have thirty (30) days from the date of hearing to pay Respondent 
X/nift907A71 
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her share of the purchase price for the property, which shall be 
$55,000,00 less Petitioner's actual incurred expenses, divided by 
two. 
2. Lake property (10691 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, 
California). There is no current offer for the purchase of this 
property. There was no meeting of minds sufficient to establish a 
contract for sale at a price of $72,000 between the parties. The 
most recent offer by a third party to purchase the property for 
$85,000.00 has been withdrawn. The Court will not require 
Petitioner to purchase the property for that price when there is 
not an outstanding offer. The property should be placed back on 
the market; if Respondent accepts a new bona fide offer for sale of 
the property, Respondent or her counsel will notify Petitioner and 
his counsel in writing of the offer and Petitioner's thirty-day 
right of first refusal will begin to run at that time; if he 
exercises his right of first refusal, he will have thirty (30) days 
after exercising the right of first refusal to pay Petitioner her 
share of the sale price (which shall be the purchase price less 
expenses actually incurred by Petitioner, divided by two). If 
Petitioner fails to exercise his right of first refusal to purchase 
the property after receipt of such an offer, and fails to cooperate 
in closing the sale of the property, he may be held in contempt of 
the Court. 
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3. 10747 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California(five 
acres). Based on the agreement of the parties, the property 
located at 10747 Forbestown Road, Yuba County, California, should 
be sold as soon as possible by closing on the offer which is 
currently outstanding. 
4. Unpaid Alimony. The Court will not find Petitioner 
in contempt at this time for his failure to pay alimony. A 
judgment has already been entered against him for unpaid alimony 
for the period from June 2003 through June 2004; the Court applies 
$13,000.00 of the funds (in the amount of $15,044.26) previously 
paid to Respondent to satisfy this judgment. 
5. Respondent's claim for additional compensation for 
sale of 10695 Forbestown Road. Respondent was entitled to accept 
the funds tendered to her by Petitioner for purchase of this 
property, as she was entitled to at least this amount. In essence, 
by providing Respondent with a "Seller's Estimated Settlement 
Statement" (Exhibit 3) reflecting that he had expenses of 
$66,426.52, Petitioner failed to disclose that he had not actually 
incurred all the expenses listed in that document. That document 
is tantamount to an affirmative representation that Petitioner had, 
in fact, incurred all those expenses in the amounts shown therein. 
The Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to deduct any 
expenses not actually incurred. In the case of this property, the 
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Court will not concern itself with the numerous small charges on 
the statement, but will award Respondent one-half of the real 
estate commissions which were not paid by Petitioner, in the amount 
of $4,350.00. The Court offsets against this amount the balance of 
$2,044.26 previously paid to Respondent by Petitioner, and awards 
Respondent the sum of $2,305.74 as remaining compensation for the 
sale of Respondent's interest in this property to Petitioner. 
6. Personal property. The Court will not find 
Respondent in contempt in connection with this issue. The Court 
finds that the lawn tractor was intended to be awarded to 
Petitioner, and awards him the sum of $2,700.00 for the lawn 
tractor, which is the value he claimed for the lawn tractor for 
purposes of dividing the personal property at the time of trial. 
This amount may be used to offset the amount awarded to Respondent 
in paragraph 5/ above, leaving a balance of $394.26 owing to 
Petitioner from Respondent for the lawn tractor. 
7. Attorney's fees and travel expenses. The Court 
reserves the issues of attorney's fees and travel expenses for 
future hearing. 
DATED this 5<JL day of U^ & , 2004. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE IN ACCORDANCE WITH URCP 7(f) 
COMES NOW JUDY DAWN BARKING, and certifies to the above-
entitled Court, in accordance with 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, that she did serve a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER AFTER HEARING upon Wesley 0. Bayles, Petitioner, 
with the understanding that the Respondent herein is to have five 
(5) days to object to or to request amendments or changes in said 
ORDER AFTER HEARING, and that if the requests are not made within 
the five (5) day period, that the ORDER AFTER HEARING shall be 
submitted to the Court for its approval and signature. Said ORDER 
ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE was delivered to Michael D. Murphy, Attorney 
for Wesley 0. Bayles, Petitioner, by mailing a copy postage prepaid 
to his mailing address of P.O. Box 15, Kaysville, Utah 84037, this 
^H day of November, 2004. 
Se 
.ate 
' ^umputing Serv ices 40 
s Estimated Settlement Statem  50-2203 
^,ncer: 
elier(s): 
/ESLEY 0. BAYLES AND CARYL BAYLES 
.ales Property:/^^FORBESTOWN RD AND APN ff S 50-060 0 / ^ 






t i n g toan: 
»yoff P r i n c i p a l Balance /?/cJL&r<tt A J-f*&/**{ 
i t e r w t Added on Statement %/n/oX ts~ ^//?/oJ jS^^ fl7&-o{*dI i^XZf.ZX 
Id i t i ona l I n t e r e s t 
To^ai E x i s t i n g Loan Charges & C r e d i t s 
ing Agert Commission C & *?&/ 
i Owners Po l i cy ( 5 0 / 5 0 ) 
i t / Transfer Tax 
f T ransfer Taxes 
Drdlng Fees 
ow ~ee (50 /50) 




Proration: 2ND INSTALLMENT 
3,'9V*/£> 
>s t o bp Pa id 1st I n s t a l l & P e n a l t y , 2nd I n s t a l l 2, Penal ty 2002 2CQ3 fee*- ATfoo/cslJ 
Sale SALE MO. / f_J ( E s t . ) (lOO t -JLO&Z ^ -T<£ e- dTpX-oXe^t) 
ard D i s c l o s u r e DISCLOSURE SAVE 
l u t e I n s p e c t i o n 
TIC INSPECTION 
MOR.ES / 
* SjbTotals *+** 
To Seller 
als 
rw/i W'rifcj/x t>f Tfif*"^ Dice To - W / e / ' 
/f s«& U 3c* fart« - 7S; *7*J?3.n K r0 % 
Charges 



























Monday, June 30, 
Wesley, 
Enclosed is the signed title for the jeep. Unfortunately, I can't sign the deed yet. I haven't 
received verification that the taxes have been paid nor anything from Mr. Helms stating 
the payments are current on the property or that is has been paid off. I am deducting the 
nonexistent expenses from the check you sent. I will forward the title as soon as the 
requested documentation has been received. Also, it would appear that I owe V2 of the 
payment to Mr. Helm after the rent was applied. If we received $600 a mo. in rent 
On the property and the payment were 854.78 it would seem that I would owe lA of the 
remaining 254.78. If indeed you have paid him. 
I am not prepared to sell you the 23 acres at the price you suggest. It is on the market and 
is to stay on the market at $89,000.00. I am willing to sell it to you for $81,100.00 which 
is the asking price less the real estate commission. I am not willing to allow for any 
expenses not actually incurred. You have no right to take the property off the market, 
without my agreement. 
I am deducting the $1529.37 that will complete the sales amount on the house, assuming 
you have paid the taxes and have Mr. Helm's current on his payments. 
I am also withholding my alimony for the rest of the year. If you can be 6 months late, for 
the first half of the year, you can be early for the second half of the year. It works for me 
and assures that I will not have to go to court again and get a garnishment against your 
retirement. A win win for everyone. 
If you do want to buy the lake property, you will need to do so completely within 60 days 
from today. I will hold the balance of $5,514.63 as a down payment. During this time, 
the property is to stay on the market to see if we get another offer, if we do you can 
match that offer if it is acceptable to both of us. If you decide not to purchase the property 
after all, I will return the down payment. 
Caryl 
